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OPEN
REVIEW ARTICLE
A systematic review and critical assessment of
incentive strategies for discovery and development
of novel antibiotics
Matthew J Renwick1, David M Brogan1,2 and Elias Mossialos1
Despite the growing threat of antimicrobial resistance, pharmaceutical and biotechnology ﬁrms are reluctant to develop novel
antibiotics because of a host of market failures. This problem is complicated by public health goals that demand antibiotic
conservation and equitable patient access. Thus, an innovative incentive strategy is needed to encourage sustainable investment
in antibiotics. This systematic review consolidates, classiﬁes and critically assesses a total of 47 proposed incentives. Given the
large number of possible strategies, a decision framework is presented to assist with the selection of incentives. This framework
focuses on addressing market failures that result in limited investment, public health priorities regarding antibiotic stewardship
and patient access, and implementation constraints and operational realities. The ﬂexible nature of this framework allows policy
makers to tailor an antibiotic incentive package that suits a country’s health system structure and needs.
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INTRODUCTION
Infectious microbial organisms are becoming increasingly resistant to
the existing arsenal of antibiotic drugs. Antibiotics are indispensable
in treating serious infections like tuberculosis, meningitis and
pneumonia, preventing surgical site infections and managing
immunocompromised individuals.1,2 It is estimated that antimicrobial
resistance (AMR) is directly responsible for 23 000 deaths annually in
the United States and more than 25 000 in the European Union.3,4 A
conservative estimate of the economic cost of bacterial resistance is
$55 billion dollars annually in the United States alone.5 Despite the
necessity for new antibiotics, the development pipeline is constrained,
especially for those that tackle lethal multidrug-resistant Gram-
negative bacteria.6 Pharmaceutical and biotechnology ﬁrms are averse
to investing in new classes of antibiotics because the market is risky
and relatively unproﬁtable. There are promising new methods of
antibiotic discovery and some novel antibiotics in development that
may not translate into marketable products if ﬁrms do not perceive
proﬁt potential.7,8
The antibiotics market has a number of characteristics that makes
it ﬁnancially unattractive to developers. First, antibiotics are less
proﬁtable than other drug categories because national conservation
programs limit sales, antimicrobials become progressively ineffective
due to AMR, there is an established generics market with many
substitutes, reimbursement systems encourage the use of the cheapest
drug and antibiotics are often prescribed for a brief duration.9,10
Second, the regulatory requirements for market approval in the
United States and European Union have been uncertain and prone
to change, creating additional development risk.11 Third, many
pharmaceutical companies have reallocated scientiﬁc talent and
capacity to more proﬁtable opportunities, thereby diminishing what
antibiotic expertise and economies of scale they originally
possessed.6,12 Therefore, ﬁrms need to be further incentivized to
invest in the discovery and development processes necessary to create
marketable novel antibacterial drugs.
Investment in antibiotics can be incentivized through two broad
strategies known as push and pull mechanisms.12,13 Push mechanisms
reduce a ﬁrm’s cost of researching and developing new drugs by
distributing the expenditures across multiple parties. Examples of push
incentives include increasing access to research, providing research
grants, offering tax incentives and establishing public–private partner-
ships for sharing research and development (R&D) outlays. In
contrast, pull mechanisms reward successful development of a drug
by increasing or ensuring future revenue. This may be in the form of
outcome-based rewards such as monetary prizes, advanced market
commitments and patent buyouts, or as lego-regulatory policies that
accelerate the market approval process, extend market exclusivity
rights and increase reimbursement prices. In addition, a combination
of complimentary push and pull incentives can be used in a hybrid
approach. Proposed hybrid approaches include the Antibiotic Con-
servation Effectiveness Program and the Options Market for
Antibiotics.14,15
The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies con-
ducted the last major review and assessment of these push and pull
incentives in 2010.12 Since then, numerous initiatives, programs and
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collaborations have been implemented with the goal of developing
innovative business models for antibiotics. The World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) is developing its Global Action Plan under steward-
ship of the Scientiﬁc and Technical Advisory Group on Antimicrobial
Resistance.16 The European Commission’s Innovative Medicines
Initiative (IMI) is Europe’s largest public–private incentive program
that supports the rapid development of safe and effective medicines for
patients.17 The IMI has established the New Drugs for Bad Bugs
(ND4BB) initiative that aims to remove the barriers associated with
antibiotic drug discovery and development through collaboration.18
Notably, DRIVE-AB is a subsidiary program within the ND4BB
initiative speciﬁcally focused on developing new economic models
for antibiotic development.19 The European Commission and Eur-
opean Investment Bank are also launching a new risk sharing and
direct loans program to ﬁnance development of new antibiotics (L
Matthiessen, 2015, personal communication). In the United Kingdom,
Prime Minister David Cameron commissioned the O’Neill Review on
Antimicrobial Resistance and in the United States President Barack
Obama released the National Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-
Resistant Bacteria.20,21 Think tanks such as Chatham House, Brook-
ings Institute, Pew Charitable Trusts and Wellcome Trust are involved
in the global effort through active working groups and conferences
that bring together policy and business leaders from around the
world.22
The purpose of this article is to systematically review published
incentive strategies to promote antibiotic research and critically assess
the advantages and disadvantages of each. A framework is also
proposed to assist policy makers in selecting appropriate incentives.
This approach focuses on correcting the key market failures that
perpetuate minimal investment in the ﬁeld, while addressing antibiotic
stewardship and patient access concerns, and accounting for imple-
mentation constraints.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A systematic review of the literature was performed to identify speciﬁc
policies, mechanisms, incentives and business models for stimulating
R&D in antibiotics using guidelines from the Centre for Reviews and
Dissemination.23 From this literature search, strategies were identiﬁed
and classiﬁed using the push–pull framework and then their advan-
tages and disadvantages were evaluated. Literature was initially sourced
from peer-reviewed journals, augmented with gray literature, and then
validated through expert opinion. Gray literature is literature not
formally published such as conference proceedings, reports, legal
documents and press releases.
Identiﬁcation, screening and eligibility assessment of peer-reviewed
and gray literature
The search protocol for peer-reviewed journals (Figure 1) was
operationalized through MEDLINE via PubMed, Scopus, Econlit,
Business Source Complete and CINAHL. Where possible, search
results were ﬁltered to include only literature that focused on humans,
was published in the past 10 years, was in English and was either a
journal article, review, systematic review, conference report or
interview.
Following compilation of initial search results, the literature was
ﬁrst screened using ineligibility criteria applied to titles and abstracts.
Articles were deemed ineligible if they focused on clinical settings,
scientiﬁc research, prescribing practices, antibiotic stewardship and
any criteria that was reﬁned in the initial search but was not applied to
all databases. The second screening involved reading each article and
assessing eligibility. Literature was deemed eligible and relevant to this
review if it discussed one or more antibiotic R&D incentive methods.
Gray literature was screened based on eligibility as it was identiﬁed
and added directly to the compilation of relevant literature. The
literature search began by identifying several key review articles and
searching their references for articles not already identiﬁed. Gray
literature was further identiﬁed through a Google search for articles,
PowerPoint presentations, advocacy statements and conference list-
ings. Websites of key advocacy groups, think tanks and policy
committees were identiﬁed and further searched for sponsored
literature.
Analysis
A total of 46 unique incentive strategies were identiﬁed from the
literature search. The strategies encompassed single incentives and
policies as well as multifaceted business models combining multiple
incentives, policies and conservation mechanisms.
Expert opinion
This set of 46 strategies was presented to experts in the ﬁeld including
academics, advocates, industry professionals and policy makers. A total
of 26 experts were initially approached, 9 experts provided feedback
and 1 new strategy was added to the consolidated list. Therefore, a
total of 47 strategies were reviewed.
Postreview critical analysis
Following compilation of all the incentive strategies, the incentives
were then critically analyzed using criteria identiﬁed from the
literature as important to creating an effective incentive package. This
critical analysis forms the basis for a framework for selecting an
optimal incentive package.
Antibiotic OR antibiotics OR antimicrobial OR antibacterial OR anti-infective [title] 
AND 
Resistance OR resistant OR drug-resistance OR drug-resistant [title/abstract] 
AND 
Research OR development OR “R&D” OR innovation [title/abstract] 
AND 
Incentive OR incentives OR policy OR policies OR mechanism OR mechanisms OR “business model” 
OR “business models” OR strategy OR strategies [title/abstract] 
Figure 1 Generalized search protocol.
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IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF INCENTIVE
STRATEGIES
Push strategies
Push mechanisms (Figure 2) seek to make drug development more
attractive to ﬁrms by lowering their costs of generating a new drug.
These incentives are useful because they reduce the barriers to entry
that preclude participation by small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs).24 These smaller ﬁrms develop a majority of new drugs, yet
frequently lack the capital to translate early preclinical research into
clinical development.11,24–27 Anti-infectives, including antibiotics, have
higher success rates than other drug categories in the ﬁnal phases of
development.28 Therefore, early push funding can help companies
reach the R&D stages that are likely to produce marketable products.
In addition, an early-stage R&D payment is more valuable than an
equal pull incentive paid at a later date because of the time value of
money. Spellberg et al.29 found that an early subsidy could be as much
as 95% smaller than an equally effective future reward. Finally, these
policy subsidies may be linked to discrete R&D stages or drug
characteristics to ensure alignment of developer goals with public
priorities.13
There is a possibility that push incentives will fund projects that
fail.13 In addition, developers have asymmetrically more information
than funders regarding a particular project’s development. Thus, there
is an opportunity for developers to misrepresent their probability of
success and project goals in order to attain ﬁnancing.12 Finally,
research subsidies may damage operational efﬁciency by reducing
ﬁnancial pressure to economize or funder guidance may overly
constrain the innovative capability of a developer.12,13 The advantages
and disadvantages of each push strategy, along with all other strategies,
can be seen in Table 1.
Pull strategies
Outcome-based pull strategies. Outcome-based pull incentives
(Figure 3) raise project valuation by increasing future revenue through
promised monetary rewards. In contrast to push mechanisms,
outcome-based pull incentives only compensate successful develop-
ment. Given that all R&D risk is borne by the developer, ﬁrms are
motivated to maximize efﬁciency and adhere to efﬁcacy requirements
set by the funder.13,30
However, ﬁnancial risk and uncertainty are substantial deterrents
for many potential market participants. This is particularly relevant to
SMEs that may lack the resources to move from early-stage research to
late-stage clinical trials. It is also difﬁcult to determine an appropriate
magnitude for the prize that must sufﬁciently motivate developers
while remaining cost effective. In addition, it is a challenge to deﬁne
the optimal set of drug characteristics linked to the reward so that they
are neither perversely speciﬁc nor too general.12 Finally, an effective
outcome-based pull system relies on a government that is willing to
stand by long-term guarantees.
Lego-regulatory pull strategies. Lego-regulatory pull incentives
(Figure 4) are government policies that indirectly facilitate higher
market returns for ﬁrms that launch a new antibiotic. Similar to
outcome-based mechanisms, lego-regulatory strategies reward only
successful research and thereby maximize R&D efﬁciency and
motivation. In addition, by basing the incentive on market factors
such as price and market exclusivity, lego-regulatory mechanisms
circumvent the issue of determining an appropriate reward size.12
However, like outcome-based mechanisms, the ﬁnancial risk of
R&D is borne by the developer, thus excluding those ﬁrms that do not
have substantial capital to market a promising antibiotic. Furthermore,
many lego-regulatory mechanisms involve market exclusivity exten-
sions that may dampen competition and innovation. When patents are
extended, generic manufacturers are prevented from entering the
market earlier and originators are less inclined to develop successive
antibiotics that could cannibalize their exclusive market.12
Hybrid strategies
Each push, outcome-based pull and lego-regulatory pull mechanism
has distinct advantages and disadvantages, but none provide a
comprehensive solution to address the market failures outlined above.
There is an increasing consensus that a single approach is not an
adequate solution.12,31 Therefore, a combination of the above incen-
tives or a hybrid strategy (Figure 5) that balances the varying attributes
of the mechanisms may be needed.
Mechanisms to fund incentives
Some proposed strategies focus on how to fund the incentives
discussed above (Figure 6). These mechanisms are not incentives
themselves, but could be used to augment an incentive package and
relieve some of the ﬁnancial burden inherent to incentivizing R&D of
antibiotics.
FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTION OF INCENTIVE STRATEGIES
Market criteria to create an attractive and supportive environment
for investment
A plethora of potential incentive strategies exist, each with their own
merits, drawbacks and level of complexity. Therefore, a framework
would be useful to assist policy makers in selecting a comprehensive
• Supporting open access to research – providing and sharing scientific databases and molecule 
libraries12,13
• Grants for scientific personnel – funding training and development of personnel specializing in 
R&D of antibiotics12,13
• Direct funding – subsidies offered to organizations for the R&D of novel antibiotics12,13
• Conditional grants – subsidies offered to organizations for the R&D of novel antibiotics that are 
specifically tied to conservation conditions in the event the antibiotic is successfully launched10
• Funding translational research – funding for facilitating cooperation and interaction throughout the 
entire supply chain including research, commercial development, and clinical application12,13
• Tax incentives  - tax credits, allowances, or deferrals that are tied to early R&D and reduce a 
developer’s current tax liability12,13
• Refundable tax credits – tax credits that can be redeemed for cash instead of reducing current tax 
liability39
• Product development partnerships (PDPs) – collaborative agreements to share development risk 
and reward between a public or quasi-public organization and one or more private developers 
(e.g. IMI and the ND4BB Initiative)12,13,32,40
Figure 2 Push strategies. IMI, Innovative Medicines Initiative; ND4BB, New Drugs for Bad Bugs;
R&D, research and development.
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Table 1 Evaluation of incentive strategies: advantages and disadvantages
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages
Push strategies
Supporting open access to
research
Lowers antibiotic research costs60
Allows early identiﬁcation of feasible targets61
Facilitates collaboration among developers61
Creates a knowledge commons that minimizes research
duplications and speeds dissemination of new information
and technology12
Relies on goodwill of researchers, industry and universities12
Patent culture may prohibit open source contributions61
Few open source tools that go beyond online data repositories
Does not address the core bottleneck of the R&D process
Grants for scientiﬁc personnel Lowers competition for skilled researchers12
Can complement other collaborative efforts such as open
access to research
Research interest does not guarantee tangible results12
Funded scientists not committed to antibiotic R&D12
Long lead time for investment64
Direct funding Lowers early R&D costs that prohibit participation of
SMEs12
Allows direct targeting of R&D towards speciﬁc priorities12
Expert technical and managerial help useful to SMEs with
less experience
Risk of project failure placed on funder12
Prone to problems of transparency and principal–agent
discrepancies12
Risk of changing political agenda12
Not well suited to support late stages of development69
Conditional grants Adds element of antibiotic stewardship to the incentive of
direct funding13
See advantages of direct funding
Challenge to ensure developers honour their conservation commit-
ments
See disadvantages of direct funding
Funding translational research Promotes synergy across the value chain12 Potential for conﬂicts of interest71
May impose perverse incentives to researchers71
Requires new IP laws to address subsequent innovation born from
collaboration
Tax incentives Easy to implement and familiar to governments; lower
administration costs12
Reduces problems of information asymmetry73
Market remains in charge of determining where investment is
proﬁtable; government dictates broad goals
Allows ﬁrms to innovate in ways that suit their particular
strengths73
Lowers incentive for ﬁrms to direct R&D towards high proﬁt,
short sighted projects12
Can be tailored to speciﬁcally beneﬁt SMEs over large cap
ﬁrms74
Allow knowledgeable ﬁrms, not governments, to dictate the
allocation of R&D investments27
No mechanism to control cost incurred by government74
Government is not able to direct R&D into areas of high social return;
less transparent than direct funding32
Risk borne by government that funded R&D projects will fail12
Incentive to employ creative accounting to maximize tax claim77
Firms that make low revenues, generally SMEs, do not beneﬁt from tax
incentives78,79
Refundable tax credits Promotes participation of SMEs39
See advantages of tax incentives
See disadvantages of tax incentives
Product development
partnerships
Allows sponsor to set the target product proﬁle and guide
development77
Non-proﬁt PDPs reduce need to maximize proﬁt through
sales12
Spread funder risk over a portfolio of projects12
PDPs pool expertise from all aspects of the development
process81
Appeal to large cap ﬁrms that value a project as too risky or
because the potential market will be too small12
Appeal to SMEs that lack the capital to overcome early-stage
development barriers82
Financial risk borne by sponsor that a funded project may fail32
Challenge to manage the interests of multiple stakeholders32
Prone to problems of transparency and principal–agent
discrepancies40
Government may not be best suited to determine viability a project40
Pull strategies
Outcome-based pull strategies
Lump sum monetary prize Rewards only successful antibiotics12
Promotes clear communication between funder and devel-
oper; avoids principal–agent problems12
Requires minimal additional infrastructure or regulation
Can be offered by nongovernmental organizations as well as
governments
Strong incentive for developers to carry drug R&D through
phase III clinical trials12
Does not help SME overcome initial R&D barriers41
All risk borne by developers41
Difﬁcult to set optimal scope of reward12
Sets a maximum value for the drug thus limiting the level of R&D into
the drug
Prone to changing political agenda41
Challenge to determine how to reward follow-on innovators83
Milestone monetary prizes Allow funder to direct R&D12
Pull SMEs through the entire R&D process12
See advantages of lump sum monetary prizes
Risk of funding projects that ultimately fails12
See disadvantages of lump sum monetary prizes
Pay-for-performance Prescribers and developers have a direct incentive to mini-
mize overuse12
Can be implemented within existing regulatory frameworks
Allows government to establish clear stewardship goals and
rewards12
Technically challenging to monitor antibiotic effectiveness, resistance,
and appropriate use
Difﬁcult to use as a direct incentive to stimulate research
Measures may provide perverse incentives to game the system12
Patent buyout Funder gains control over antibiotic price and volume;
supports conservation and access goals12
Rewards only successful development12
Promotes clear communication regarding antibiotic charac-
teristics; avoids principal–agent problem12
Funder can license out IP12
All development risk borne by developer41
Requires large ﬁnancial outlay from funder10
High cost to buyout makes political support challenging
Industry barriers to public ownership of IP41,58
Risk of funding suboptimal drug; little remaining funding to purchase
drug improvements41,84
New agency may be needed to manage acquisition of IP41,63
Pricing buyout technically difﬁcult10,41
Payer license Funder gains control over antibiotic price and volume;
supports conservation and access goals10
Permits competitive pricing for license if multiple players10
Rewards only successful development12
Not committed to rolling over license if drug becomes
suboptimal10
Maintain patent ownership with developer58
Requires annual renegotiations of licenses; expensive transaction
cost10
Minimal R&D incentive over other mechanisms10
Pricing license technically difﬁcult
Risk of changing political agenda
All development risk borne by developer
Optional reward Gives developer greater ﬂexibility with regards to revenue
source13
See advantages of patent buyout
If developer chooses to keep the patent then there remains signiﬁcant
incentive to over-market the antibiotic13
See disadvantages of patent buyout
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Table 1 (Continued )
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages
Research tournament Competition may stimulate an increase in quality of
submissions85
Tournaments with multiple rounds allow for selection of a few
promising ideas85
Attracts developers that believe they have a competitive
advantage or a promising molecule12
Collusion degrades the quality of submissions30
Winner not incentivized to produce and distribute product12
Risk of funding failed projects
Tournaments are not well suited to promote new drug development in
the expensive and risky late stages of R&D12
SMEs may not have the resources to compete with large cap ﬁrms,
limiting the effect of competition12
Advanced market
commitment
Only rewards successful development12
Price guarantee lowers risk for developer12
Prices are set based on a county’s ability to pay; improves
patient access86
Does not require signiﬁcant changes in regulatory statutes or
laws; reward determined through the market 42
Challenging to set drug speciﬁcations beforehand12
Maintains artiﬁcially high prices in some countries; limits patient
access12
Government commitment to purchase may led to acquiring inferior
products12,13
No guarantee on volume means developer revenues are still highly
dependent on sales volume12
Antibiotic Health Impact
Fund
Antibiotics offered at marginal cost; improve access43
Reward based on health impact encourages ﬁrms to provide
access to the poor or in developing countries where impact
would likely be greatest43
Proﬁtability of projects tied to global public health impact;
aligns ﬁrm incentive with global priorities43
Fewer patent litigations as generic distribution would
increase developer proﬁts43
Incentive for developer to limit unnecessary use; opportunity
to coordinate with hospitals and patients43
Funder only pays for health impact; cost effective use of
public resources43
Global solution to a global problem; based on an interna-
tionally coordinated action plan43
Original AHIF would be voluntary; undermines conservation incentives
of the AHIF43
Requires substantial upfront payments
Does not provide any push for developing new antibiotic; particularly a
problem for SME
International coordination complicated
New global agency needed to manage AHIF43
Industry barriers to public ownership of IP41,87
Global surveillance and assessment of health impact pose signiﬁcant
cost and technical challenge 41,87
Signiﬁcant uncertainty over health impact reduce R&D incentive41
Challenge to determine which drugs meet the criteria for inclusion
Antibiotic Innovation
Funding Mechanism
Decouples proﬁts from sales volume; reinforces conservation
efforts44
Decouples proﬁts from prices; improves equity of access44
Encourage open sharing of relevant information, materials,
and technology44
Global solution to a global problem; based on an interna-
tionally coordinated action plan44
Consumption fee helps self-sustain the fund and encourage
appropriate use44
Payments throughout development chain encourage SME
participation44
Tax may hinder appropriate use at point of care62
Monetary prizes must be signiﬁcant to incentivize R&D12
Milestone prizes place risk on funder12
High cost to buyout makes political support challenging12
Difﬁcult to set optimal scope of reward12
International coordination and politics complicates the management
of the fund
Industry barriers to public ownership of IP58,63
Strategic Antibiotic Reserve Acts as insurance policy against growing AMR, pandemics, or
bioterrorism10,14
See advantages for patent buyout and payer license
Exceptionally high public cost to buy ﬁrst-in-class drug10
Risk of cross-resistance undermining drug effectiveness without
beneﬁt from use65
See disadvantages for patent buyout and payer license
Service-availability
premiums
Partially decouples proﬁts from sales volume; promotes
conservation efforts31
Acts as insurance policy against growing AMR, pandemics or
bioterrorism31
Shift responsibility of long-term patient access to the
antibiotic to the developer31
Reimburses the developer for all the ancillary services
required for delivery of antibiotics, particularly in
emergencies31
The premiums can be linked to mutually agreed key
performance and conservation indicators31
Developer still incentivized to maximize sales before end of patent
Challenge to determine an appropriate size of annual fee
Difﬁcult to incorporate key performance indicators linked to annual
payments
Lego-regulatory pull strategies
Accelerated assessment and
approval
Lowers cost of developing antibiotics12
Speeds up access to antibiotics66
May compromise safety and efﬁcacy of approval process67,68
Slows approval process for non-antibiotic drugs12
Does not beneﬁt SMEs that have difﬁculty reaching the clinical trial
assessment stages12
Increase public cost to expedite review and fund quickly released
antibiotics
Market exclusivity extensions Developer can recoup R&D costs that may not have been
covered by a patent’s effective life
Monopoly prices can reduce inappropriate use of
antibiotics46
An indeﬁnite patent could place the responsibility of an
antibiotic’s long-term sustainability with developer70
High prices limit patient access and place signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden
on the health system70
Reduces pressure to develop new drugs12
Developer incentive to maximize sales before end of patent12
Delay generic entry and competition32
Wild-card extensions/ transfer-
able intellectual property
rights
Flexible reward that can be tailored to the stage of innovation
the government wishes to incentivize72
Only rewards completed projects12
Sale of TIPR allows SMEs to beneﬁt12
No mechanism to ensure efﬁcacy of new antibiotic47
Transfers a rent to consumers of blockbuster drugs TIPR
are applied to47
Distorts market signals by attaching reward to unrelated drug75
Conservation-based market
exclusivity
Makes developers ﬁnancially accountable for antibiotic
resistance46
Aligns industry proﬁt goals with public antibiotic stewardship
goals
See advantages of market exclusivity extensions
Requires expensive monitoring of antibiotic effectiveness
Maintains artiﬁcially high prices; limits patient access and places
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden on the health system12
Does not prevent resistance outside the implementing country76
Cross-resistance can reduce effectiveness through no fault of
developer65
Liability limitations Incentivizes antibiotics for bioterrorism that are difﬁcult to
thoroughly test12
No upfront costs to the government12
Promote R&D of rare bacterial pathogens that may have little
ﬁnancial return to the developer without exposing themselves
to potential lawsuits12
Extension of liability protection beyond those needed for national
defense may instigate a slippery legal slope
Insulation from liability may incentivize companies to be more reckless
and push for broader indications for usage; may require closer
government monitoring80
Incentive strategies for development of antibiotics
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Table 1 (Continued )
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages
Anti-trust waivers Encourages developers to hold antibiotics in reserve until
needed12
Allows developers to cooperate to limit resistance12
Discourages competition and entry of generics; maintains high prices
and lowers access12
Lack of threat of generic entry may stiﬂe innovation47
Once a single drug in a class loses its patent, the ability of developers
to control resistance through collusion fails70
Sui generis rights Makes developers ﬁnancially accountable for antibiotic
resistance12
Encourage developers to be more conservative with indica-
tions and volume12
Maintains high prices; hinders patient access and places signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial burden on the health system
Unclear how this would affect the patent system as a whole12
Lack of threat of generic entry may stiﬂe innovation47
Value-based reimbursement Natural incentive for R&D into novel and high priority
antibiotics46
Society pays for what it beneﬁts from and values14
Higher prices can minimize inappropriate use of
antibiotics14,45
Dis-incentivizes low value knock-on R&D
Opportunity for re-evaluation of reimbursement rates to
reﬂect changes in antibiotic effectiveness14
Requires a substantial increase in reimbursement rates14
Requires expensive and slow health technology assessment of many
drugs on the market14
Does not directly provide early-stage capital infusion needed by SMEs
to overcome R&D barriers12
Strong link between developer revenue and sales volume; incentive to
overmarket and promote antibiotics
The Generating Antibiotics
Incentives Now Act
Government provides guidance and resources to developers to
clarify authorization requirements and lego-regulatory
processes12,61
See advantages of market exclusivity extensions and accel-
erated assessment and approval
Eligibility deﬁnition is slow, inﬂexible and does not specify standards
for safety and efﬁcacy10,88
Does not include any provisions for antibiotic conservation and
appropriate use of new antibiotics89
GAIN market exclusivity extensions run concurrently with patent
protection, and may not provide beneﬁt to drugs that have a
substantial period of exclusivity through their patent extension50
See disadvantages of market exclusivity extensions and accelerated
assessment and approval
Limited Population Antibac-
terial Drug approval
Improves antibiotic access for patients38
Lowers development costs90
Regulatory body can monitor a LPAD’s safety and
efﬁcacy38
Encourages ﬁrms to R&D drugs that combat rare pathogens
and newly resistant strains of bacteria90
Narrow indication encourages LPAD antibiotics to be pre-
scribed conservatively91
Difﬁcult for physicians to administer an LPAD in accordance with its
labeled indication as diagnostic services remain slow90
High prices on LPADs can prohibit patient access90
Priority review vouchers Facilitates faster patient access to drugs expedited with
vouchers92
Ability to sell to other ﬁrms allows SMEs to beneﬁt from the
program12
Possibility for voucher application to blockbuster drugs draws
large cap ﬁrms to antibiotics market
Creates competition uncertainty in the entire pharmaceutical
market32,92
In the United States, requirement for holders to inform the Food and
Drug Administration 1 year in advance of ﬁling for a new drug
application greatly diminishes value of a priority review voucher32
May compromise safety and efﬁcacy of approval process67,68
Reduced incentive to bring the antibiotic to market after the voucher
has been sold49
Vouchers in the European Union are complicated by the decentralized
regulatory system12
New technology add-on
payment
Lowers revenue uncertainty by ensuring patient access50
NTAP rewards only successful, novel innovation50
Program has resulted in a decrease in Medicare
spending51
Program’s eligibility deﬁnition lacks clarity51
NTAP payments may be too low and do not provide enough of
a mark-up to sufﬁciently incentivize developers51
Increased hospital reimbursement removes hospital efﬁciency
incentives to conserve use of an antibiotic10
Developing an Innovative
Strategy for Antimicrobial
Resistant Microbes Act
Reduces the reimbursement risk for the developer53
Only successfully developed antibiotics are funded53
Reimbursement is attached to antibiotic stewardship53
Brings together key stakeholders to ﬁnd a solution
See advantages of NTAP
See disadvantages of NTAP
21st Century Cures Act Integrates an additional funding source that can be used for
push incentives
See advantages of LPAD approval and TIPR
Donation requirement may discourage ﬁrms from purchasing TIPR
from successful antibiotic developers
See disadvantages of LPAD approval and TIPR
Hybrid strategies
Special drug designation
status
Orphan drug designation already exists in the United States
and European Union12
Historically effective at stimulating R&D of drugs with poor
reimbursement prospects
Push funding promotes participation from SMEs32
See advantages of accelerated assessment and approval,
market exclusivity extensions, direct funding, and tax
incentives
Funding only covers clinical phases; minimal funding for necessary
preclinical research93
Current orphan drug legislation focuses on long-term/chronic diseases;
broad spectrum antibiotics not suitable for this designation
High prices limit patient access and place signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden
on the health system12
Developer incentive to maximize sales12
See disadvantages of accelerated assessment and approval, market
exclusivity extensions, direct funding and tax incentives
Options market for antibiotics Allows countries to pool resources together and with
nongovernmental organizations to incentivize R&D15
Funders can diversify their risk across developers and
between drugs at different stages of development15
SMEs can receive the needed early funding to overcome
initial R&D barriers15
Potential for secondary market that brings needed capital and
liquidity to market15
Allow previously benched antibiotics to be reinstated based
on improved proﬁtability prospects15
Funder’s purchase commitment controls some sales volume;
promotes conservation efforts15
Options strike price can be set at the drug’s marginal cost
that delinks proﬁt from sales volume15
Does not completely delink developer proﬁt from sales volume unless
the strike price is set at marginal cost
Early investment places signiﬁcant risk on the investor15
Prone to principal–agent problems as developers may try to game the
system to secure more funding15
Does not directly encourage follow-on innovation unless multiple
projects are funded in early stages15
Technically challenging to price the call options15
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Table 1 (Continued )
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages
Ofﬁce of Health Economics’
model
Shares risk between funder and developer55
Partially delinks sales volume from developer proﬁt; promotes
conservation efforts55
Flexible local pricing allows price to reﬂect variation in
resistance across regions55
Challenge to determine an appropriate size of annual fee to generate
investment
Local pricing may be difﬁcult to implement in a free trade zone or
within a single country
Unclear how follow-on innovation will be incentivized
Difﬁcult to incorporate conservation criteria linked to annual payments
Antibiotic Conservation Effec-
tiveness Program
Integrates well into existing quality reporting metrics14
See advantages of conservation-based market exclusivity,
anti-trust waivers and value-based reimbursement14
Signiﬁcant public cost from regulatory changes and monitoring
See disadvantages of conservation-based market exclusivity, anti-trust
waivers and value-based reimbursement
Project BioShield Act Creates a guaranteed market to ﬁll federal stockpile needs
and establish a credible purchasing agreement94
Milestone payments help SMEs with early development
costs12
Allows access to antibiotics not yet approved by Food and
Drug Administration in times of emergency94
See advantages of accelerated assessment and review,
milestone prizes, direct funding and AMCs
Political indecision over purchase commitments has increased
uncertainty for developers32,53
Annual funding makes long-term planning difﬁcult12
Contracts have generally been too small to attract large cap ﬁrms32
Not speciﬁcally targeted at antibiotics useful to the public
Poor liability protection limits the effectiveness of the incentive32
See disadvantages of accelerated assessment and review, milestone
prizes, direct funding, and AMCs
Rewarding Antibiotic
Development and Responsible
Stewardship Program
All key components of program already exist in the United
States (NTAP and Project BioShield)56
Only rewards successful development
Reduces reimbursement risk for developer56
Delinks revenue from volume and price (if guarantee large);
reinforces conservation efforts and equity of access10
Higher prices afforded by NTAP erode the conservation efforts of the
guarantee10
NTAP removes stewardship incentive of lower-priced diagnostic-
related groups10
Hospital-based and United States centric; difﬁcult to scale up
Long period of NTAP risks overpaying for suboptimal drug in the
future10
Antibiotics as Public Goods Decouples proﬁts from sales volume; reinforces conservation
efforts10
Involves developing countries in R&D of antibiotics57
Focuses on early-stage development; lowers barriers of entry
for SME57
Open source approach encourages collaboration among all
stakeholders (particularly developing countries)95
Public ownership allows marginal cost pricing; improves
equity of access10,57
Global solution to a global problem; based on an interna-
tionally coordinated action plan
Early stage patent buy-out places high risk on funder97
Scientiﬁc risk with emphasizing only natural products as a source of
new antibiotics96
Requires large ﬁnancial outlay from funder
Industry barriers to public ownership of IP
New global agency required to publicly manage acquisition of
patents57
Pricing buyout technically difﬁcult
International coordination and politics complicates the management
of the fund
LPAD Plus Decouples proﬁts from sales volume; reinforces conservation
efforts10
See advantages of LPAD Approval
Can increase uncertainty of developer revenue10
Pricing conservation incentive technically difﬁcult10
See disadvantages of LPAD Approval
WHO Global Consortium Funder gains control over antibiotic price and volume;
supports conservation and access goals10,13
Push incentives encourage crucial participation of SMEs12,27
Push funding through entire value chain36
Public funding of clinical trials increases transparency and
sharing of important clinical data,36,37
Purchase commitments give strict control over volume and
generic distribution36
Global solution to a global problem; based on an interna-
tionally coordinated action plan36
Pricing buyout technically difﬁcult12
Almost all risk borne by public35
Challenge to generate signiﬁcant international funding for such as
consortium35
Industry barriers to public ownership of IP58
New entity may be needed to manage the entire supply chain35
Risk funding projects which fail12
Pushback from animal sector35,98
Prone to principal–agent problem12
GlaxoSmithKline Delinkage
Model
Funder gains control over antibiotic price and volume;
supports conservation and access goals10
License negotiated before critical late-stage trials; reduces
developer risk58
Funder not forced to roll over license if antibiotic becomes
suboptimal10
Push incentives encourage crucial participation of SMEs58
Strategy not fully formulated10
Requires annual renegotiations of licenses; expensive transaction
cost10
Pricing license technically difﬁcult
Early funding places ﬁnancial risk on funder12
Enables developer inefﬁciency12
Prone to principal–agent problem12
Mechanisms to fund incentives
Fast-track option for
funding
Flexible funding to ﬁnance multiple types of incentives59
Efﬁciency gains for both the developer and the public59
Allows developers that do not wish to participate in antibiotic
development to contribute funds59
Only a funding mechanism and does not directly incentivize R&D
Fast regulatory review may compromise safety41,67,68
May require new auction system59
Antibiotic Corporate Bond Flexible funding to ﬁnance multiple types of incentives31
Allows developers that do not wish to participate in antibiotic
development to contribute funds
Patent extensions could be offered to nonpharmaceutical
industries31
Only a funding mechanism and does not directly incentivize R&D
Offering patent extensions to nonpharmaceutical industries raises
legal issues31
Creates competition uncertainty in the markets patent extensions are
offered
Creates inequity in the patent system by allowing wealthy ﬁrms to
outbid SMEs for patent extensions31
High prices associated with market exclusivity limit patient access and
place signiﬁcant ﬁnancial burden on the health system31
Antibiotic Innovation and
Conservation fee
Induces conservation of antibiotics through higher prices40
Fee can be adjusted to reﬂect value and risk of use of
antibiotic40
Helps to sustain R&D funding programs and stewardship
programs40
Only a funding mechanism and does not directly incentivize R&D
Tax may hinder appropriate use at point of care62
Abbreviations: AHIF, Antibiotic Health Impact Fund; AMC, Advanced Market Commitment; AMR, antimicrobial resistance; GAIN Act, Generating Antibiotic Innovation Now Act; IP, intellectual
property; LPAD, Limited Population Antibacterial Drug; NTAP, new technology add-on payment; PDP, product-development partnership; R&D, research and development; SME, small- and medium-
sized enterprises; TIPR, transferable intellectual property rights; WHO, World Health Organization.
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and effective incentive package. Given the serious market failures
outlined earlier, the key goal of any antibiotics incentive package is the
creation of an attractive and supportive environment for investment.
To achieve this, the following market criteria must be met:
1. Improve the overall net present value (NPV) for new antibiotic
projects.
2. Enable greater participation of SMEs.
3. Encourage participation by large pharmaceutical companies.
4. Facilitate cooperation and synergy across the antibiotic market.
Improve the overall NPV for new antibiotic projects. Net present value
is the sum of all costs and revenues of a given project adjusted for the
time value of money and risk of failure. It is a general measure of the
proﬁtability of a project. Sharma and Towse32 estimated the current
• Lump sum monetary prize – a large financial reward for the successful development of a novel 
antibiotic12,13,41
• Milestone monetary prizes – incremental monetary rewards paid at various stages of the 
development process12,13,41
• Pay-for-performance (P4P) – developers receive rewards for achieving quality goals relating to 
the antibiotic’s consumption and resistance levels10
• Patent buyout – large end prize given in exchange for the intellectual property (IP) rights to a 
successfully developed antibiotic10,12
• Optional reward – the developer can choose between a patent buyout reward or maintaining the 
patent for that antibiotic13
• Payer license – developer sells an annual license for unlimited access to an antibiotic at marginal 
cost10
• Research tournament – competitive milestone prizes awarded to the first developer(s) to reach 
certain checkpoints13
• Advanced market commitment (AMC) – an agreement to purchase a set volume of antibiotic for a 
pre-specified price upon successful development12,42
• Antibiotic Health Impact Fund (AHIF) – antibiotics registered in the AHIF would receive annual 
retrospective payments proportional to their share of health impact across the fund’s registered 
drugs43
• Antibiotic Innovation Funding Mechanism (AIFM) – a combination of monetary payments for 
licensing patents and a demand-side user fee to fund the prizes44
• Strategic Antibiotic Reserve – a single or group of governments buy or license the patent for an 
important first-in-class antibiotic to keep the drug from being marketed14,45
• Service-availability premiums – akin to an annual insurance premium, which is paid to a 
developer to ensure an antibiotic can be adequately produced and delivered when needed31
Figure 3 Outcome-based pull strategies.
• Accelerated assessment and approval – fast track programs and priority reviews that reduce the 
length of drug registration and market approval for antibiotics that meet certain specifications12
• Market exclusivity extensions – increase the period of IP and data exclusivity offered for an 
antibiotic12,46,47
• Wild card extensions/ transferable intellectual property rights (TIPR) – extended IP protection that 
can be transferred to other drugs in a portfolio12,47
• Conservation-based market exclusivity – market exclusivity of an antibiotic is tied to meeting 
effectiveness targets14,46
• Liability limitations – legal protection against litigation in the event of injury or death related to 
antibiotics targeting bioterrorism and pandemic diseases12
• Anti-trust waivers – relaxing anti-trust laws to allow developers to collude in order to prevent 
further resistance arising; alternatively, may allow developers to sell on-patent IP to other 
developers that result in a monopoly over a group of similar antibiotics12
• Sui generis rights – offers market exclusivity to a firm for IP that has come off patent12
• Value-based reimbursement – Setting reimbursement prices for antibiotics based on health 
technology assessment of the drug’s value to society12,46
• The Generating Antibiotics Incentives Now (GAIN) Act – a US bill ratified in 2012, which provides 
five years of additional market exclusivity, priority review and fast track approval, and Food and 
Drug Administration guidance for antibiotic development48
• Limited Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) approval – a streamlined clinical trial process for 
novel antibiotics that allows the drug’s safety and efficacy to be studied based on substantially 
smaller, faster, and less expensive trials38
• Priority review vouchers – vouchers for accelerated regulatory review awarded post-approval to 
developers of an antibiotic and can be sold or transferred to other products within the developers 
portfolio12,13,32,49
• New technology add-on payment (NTAP) – a US hospital reimbursement plan that pays over and 
above the diagnostic related group category for a particular treatment50,51
• Developing an Innovative Strategy for Antimicrobial Resistant Microbes (DISARM) Act – a 
proposed US bill that would build on NTAP by offering permanently higher payments for qualified 
antibiotics to those hospitals participating in the Antimicrobial Use and Resistance Module of the 
National Healthcare Safety Network52,53
• 21st Century Cures Act – a proposed US bill with provisions that offers qualified antibiotics a 
streamlined LPAD approval process and the option for up to twelve months of transferable market 
exclusivity; purchasers of this transferable market exclusivity are required to donate a portion of 
gross sales to AMR research and patient access programs54
Figure 4 Lego-regulatory pull strategies. AMR, antimicrobial resistance; IP, intellectual property; US,
United States.
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risk-adjusted NPV for developing an antibiotic to be − $50 million. In
contrast, the risk-adjusted NPV for a neurological drug is + $720
million, and for a musculoskeletal drug this ﬁgure soars to +$1.15
billion. As long as the NPV for antibiotic projects remains negative or
relatively low, any company looking to maximize proﬁts will not
spend signiﬁcant resources on this class of drugs. Financial incentives
that increase revenues, decrease costs or lower the risk of R&D make
investment more appealing to all market players. Sharma and Towse32
suggest that a reasonable target for NPV should be $200 million to
make investment in antibiotics competitive with other therapeutic
classes.
Enable greater participation of SMEs. Small biotech corporations and
spinoffs from university research labs hold promising, novel ideas and
actually make up a majority of pharmaceutical R&D market share.
Munos24 found that between the early 1980s to early 2000s, the
proportion of all new drugs attributable to SMEs had increased from
23% to 70%. However, SMEs have much smaller capital reserves than
large pharmaceutical companies, hindering the transition from initial
research to expensive late-stage trials required for market approval.
This is particularly detrimental to antibiotic development because the
probability of clinical trial success for an antibiotic is positively
weighted toward the later phases.33 Thus, incentives that provide
milestone payments, early seed money or reduce their cost of initial
R&D allow smaller ﬁrms to move a promising antibiotic into the more
favorable late-stage clinical trials.
Encourage participation by large pharmaceutical companies. Large
market capitalization (large cap) pharmaceutical companies do not
have the same capital restrictions faced by most SMEs. If a project is
determined to be signiﬁcantly proﬁtable, then large pharmaceutical
ﬁrms can often secure the needed funding. However, they are more
concerned with the antibiotic market’s uncertainty with regard to size,
risk, volatility and regulation. Large cap companies need annual
revenues of ∼ $800 million for a drug to remain proﬁtable.34 In
contrast, SMEs often only need to generate revenues of $100 to $200
million per year.34 For this reason, large companies seek greater
revenue certainty and regulatory transparency. These come from
credible market commitments as well as large ﬁnancial rewards for
successful antibiotic development.
Facilitate cooperation and synergy across the antibiotic market. There is
an opportunity to encourage cooperation and synergy among key
industry, academic and government players in the antibiotic market.
This involves sharing information, resources and expertise among
stakeholders to create additional value in the market. The ideal
incentive would reward collaboration by encouraging ﬁrms to
cooperate to meet public health goals, share important human
resources, streamline the supply chain and improve regulatory
transparency. Not only do these incentives indirectly reduce the cost
of antibiotic R&D, but they also help to align public and private
priorities.
• Special drug designation status – in similar fashion to the current EU/US orphan drug designation, 
novel antibiotics are given market exclusivity over the indication, additional data exclusivity, grants 
for clinical research, tax credits on clinical costs, protocol assistance, and accelerated review12,13
• Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) – a funder pays a developer a premium in return for the right 
to purchase a set volume of antibiotics at a discount upon successful launch15
• Office of Health Economics’ model – combines an AMC at a national or supranational level and 
local value-based pricing55
• Antibiotic Conservation Effectiveness (ACE) Program – a comprehensive system involving value-
based reimbursement, P4P payments, conservation-based market exclusivity, and anti-trust 
waivers14
• Project BioShield Act – a US bill enacted in 2004 that provides a guaranteed federal market (i.e. 
an AMC) for medical countermeasures to treat chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
threats as well as a federal funding system to stimulate development of drugs not ready for 
procurement12,32
• Rewarding Antibiotic Development and Responsible Stewardship (RADARS) Program –
combination of NTAP payments for novel antibiotics and a guaranteed minimum annual revenue 
for developers over the drug’s first five years on the market56
• Antibiotics as Public Goods – milestone monetary prizes for early-stage antibiotic discovery, non-
exclusive licensing for promising antibiotics, and an open source platform to share intellectual 
property, data, and clinical results57
• LPAD Plus – the LPAD approval system combined with a monetary prize in return for 
conservation commitments and marginal cost pricing10
• WHO Global Consortium – a multifaceted model combining milestone prizes and research grants 
for promising drug candidates, open source sharing of knowledge and information, publicly 
financed clinical trials, patent buyouts of successfully developed antibiotics, and advanced 
purchase commitments for generic distribution35
• GlaxoSmithKline’s Delinkage Model – an annual payer license combined with a variety of pull 
incentives such as PDPs, tax credits, and research grants58
Figure 5 Hybrid strategies. AMC, Advanced Market Commitment; EU, European Union; LPAD, Limited
Population Antibacterial Drug; NTAP, new technology add-on payment; PDP, product-development
partnership; P4P, pay-for-performance; US, United States.
• Fast-track option for funding – auction priority review vouchers to developers and use the 
earnings as push funding for antibiotic R&D59
• Antibiotic Corporate Bond – government-guaranteed ten-year bonds financed through the sale of
patent extension certificates31
• Antibiotic Innovation and Conservation (AIC) fee – a tax applied per prescription used to fund
push incentives and stewardship programs40
Figure 6 Mechanisms to fund incentives. R&D, research and development.
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A market-based framework for incentive selection
The primary goal of an incentive package is to create an attractive and
supportive market for investment in antibiotics. As discussed above,
this is accomplished by improving the NPV of antibiotic R&D
projects, lowering barriers for SME participation, encouraging large
cap companies to invest in the market and facilitating cooperation and
synergy among all stakeholders. The following framework (Table 2) is
an incentive classiﬁcation system based on these four market criteria.
It then follows that an incentive package that aims to create a
supportive and attractive market for investment in antibiotics could be
created through:
1. A single type 1 incentive.
2. A combination of type 2 and type 3 incentives.
3. A combination of type 3, type 4 and type 5 incentives.
Type 6 incentives could be used, but tend to be weaker market
incentives and may be less effective at generating investment and
market interest. As seen in Table 3, each incentive has been classiﬁed
into one of the six types, depending on its ability to meet the market
criteria.
Factoring in public health objectives: stewardship and access
Beyond creating a viable market for antibiotics, an incentive package
should reinforce broader public health objectives pertaining to AMR.
There are two key public health objectives that are interrelated with
the economic aspects of an antibiotics market:
1. Promoting antibiotic stewardship.
2. Improving patient access to new antibiotics.
Promoting antibiotic stewardship. Research and development of
antibiotics also needs to be sustainable in addition to being proﬁtable.
The traditional patent-based business model rewards developers
through market exclusivity, providing the opportunity to command
high prices. Once a patent expires, the market is ﬂooded with generic
drugs that compete based on sales volume in a race against impending
resistance.10 This unsustainable business model reinforces the
overmarketing and overconsumption of antibiotics that has contrib-
uted to high levels of AMR. Simply increasing developer return on
investment does not address this problem directly. Numerous experts
have proposed antibiotic business models that reinforce conservation
efforts by completely severing a developer’s return on investment from
sales volume and price (for example, Antibiotic Health Impact Fund
(AHIF), Antibiotics as Public Goods and Rewarding Antibiotic
Development and Responsible Stewardship Program (RADARS)).
This concept is known as delinkage and is beneﬁcial for three key
reasons.10 First, it provides developers with a concrete return on
investment that is extraneous to the market. Second, delinkage
removes the motivation for developers to oversupply their antibiotic.
Third, it facilitates access to new antibiotics for those who need them
Table 2 Market-based framework for selection of incentive strategies
Incentive type Deﬁnition
1 Broad-spectrum market incentives Meet all four market criteria
2 Participation-focused incentives Improve NPV and entice both SMEs and
large cap ﬁrms to invest in antibiotic
R&D but may not facilitate cooperation
and synergy
3 Collaboration and synergy-focused
incentives
Facilitate cooperation and synergy
4 SME-focused incentives Improve NPV and primarily beneﬁt just
SMEs but may not facilitate cooperation
and synergy
5 Large cap-focused incentives Improve NPV and primarily beneﬁt just
large cap ﬁrms but may not facilitate
cooperation and synergy
6 Weak market incentives Incentives or funding mechanisms that
only meet one of the four market criteria
Abbreviations: NPV, net present value; R&D, research and development; SME, small- and
medium-sized enterprises.
Table 3 Classiﬁcation of incentive strategies using the market-based
framework
Type 1: Broad-spectrum market incentives
PDP (Ps)
Special drug designation (H)
Antibiotics as public goods (H)
WHO global consortium (H)
Type 2: Participation-focused incentives
Refundable tax credit (Ps)
Milestone prizes (Pl)
AIFM (Pl)
OMA (H)
Project BioShield (H)
GlaxoSmithKline’s Delinkage (H)
Type 3: Cooperation/synergy-focused incentives
Supporting open access (Ps)
Funding translational research (Ps)
AHIF (Pl)
LPAD (LR)
Anti-trust waivers (LR)
RADARS Program (H)
LPAD Plus (H)
Type 4: SME-focused incentives
Grants for scientiﬁc personnel (Ps)
Direct funding (Ps)
Conditional grants (Ps)
Service-availability premiums (Pl)
Patent buyout (Pl)
Optional reward (Pl)
Strategic Antibiotic Reserve (Pl)
Type 5: Large cap-focused incentives
Tax incentives (Ps)
Lump sum monetary prize (Pl)
Payer license (Pl)
AMC (Pl)
Accelerated assessment and
approval (LR)
Market exclusivity extensions (LR)
Conservation-based market exclu-
sivity (LR)
TIPR (LR)
Liability protection (LR)
Sui generis rights (LR)
Value-based reimbursement (LR)
GAIN Act (LR)
Priority review vouchers (LR)
NTAP (LR)
DISARM (LR)
21st Century Cures Act (LR)
Ofﬁce of Health Economics’ Model (H)
ACE Program (H)
Type 6: Weak market incentives
P4P (Pl)
Research tournament (Pl)
Antibiotic corporate bond (F)
Fast-track option for funding (F)
AIC fee (F)
Abbreviations: ACE, Antibiotic Conservation Effectiveness; AHIF, Antibiotic Health Impact Fund;
AIC, Antibiotic Innovation and Conservation; AIFM, Antibiotic Innovation Funding Mechanism;
AMC, Advanced Market Commitment; DISARM, Developing an Innovative Strategy for
Antimicrobial Resistant Microbes; F, incentive funding mechanism; GAIN Act, Generating
Antibiotic Innovation Now Act; H, hybrid push–pull incentive; LPAD, Limited Population
Antibacterial Drug; LR, lego-regulatory incentive; NTAP, new technology add-on payment; OMA,
options market for antibiotics; P4P, pay-for-performance; PDP, product-development
partnership; Pl, pull incentive; Ps, push incentive; RADARS, Rewarding Antibiotic Development
and Responsible Stewardship; SME, small- and medium-sized enterprises; TIPR, transferable
intellectual property rights; WHO, World Health Organization.
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most. Other experts advocate the use of demand-side antibiotic usage
fees to internalize the negative externalities accompanying antibiotic
use (for example, Antibiotic Innovation and Conservation (AIC) fee
and Antibiotic Innovation Funding Mechanism (AIFM)). This fee can
then be used to ﬁnance other incentive mechanisms such as milestone
payments or end prizes.
Improving patient access to new antibiotics. Patient access to new
antibiotics plays an important role in controlling the spread of AMR
and preserving existing antibiotics. However, under the current
patent-based business model, developers are incentivized to distribute
their new antibiotics based on ability to pay instead of need.10 This
may not be a problem for countries with universal access to
pharmaceuticals. However, for those countries without complete
public pharmaceutical coverage, drug prices remain a signiﬁcant
hurdle to patient access. This issue can be complicated by
conservation-related restrictions on antibiotic use as well as technical
challenges with distribution. This may be overcome by transferring or
licensing out a new antibiotic’s patent to the government along with
the responsibility of distribution and equitable access (for example,
patent buyout and payer license). Other proposals streamline the
regulatory approval process to allow new antibiotics with signiﬁcant
therapeutic value to reach the market faster (for example, Limited
Population Antibacterial Drug (LPAD) approval and special drug
status).
Factoring in public health objectives. Selection of incentives using the
above market framework must be done with consideration of public
health goals. An incentive package that meets the four market criteria
may not effectively support these public health goals. For instance, the
type 1 incentive, special drug designation, does not align developer
promotion and marketing goals with conservation priorities. In this
case, an additional incentive or incentives are necessary to augment
this package. Aspects of conservation could be encouraged through
conditional grants and pay-for-performance (P4P) prizes alongside the
special drug designation incentives that stimulate market investment.
In some cases, incentives may directly contravene public health
objectives. For example, market exclusivity extensions and value-
based pricing directly incentivize ﬁrms to continue overmarketing
antibiotics and distributing based on ability to pay. For this reason,
these types of incentives may need to be altered or not included in the
package. Market exclusivity extensions could be swapped out for
conservation-based market exclusivity extensions and value-based
pricing could require continual reassessment to reﬂect antibiotic
effectiveness.
Factoring in implementation feasibility
Not only does any potential incentive package need to be compre-
hensive, it must also be feasible. Many of the proposals discussed have
been developed on a theoretical level, but rarely tested or deployed.
Although design of appropriate incentives is challenging, it pales in
comparison with the political, regulatory, industry and ﬁnancial
hurdles that may be faced during implementation. A comprehensive
strategy that is unwieldy, too complex and ﬁnancially unreasonable
provides no advantage. Therefore, more pragmatic design constraints
must be considered. These will ultimately reﬂect a nation’s political
priorities, operational realities and industry demands concerning:
1. The size of the incentives.
2. The timing of incentive delivery.
3. Governance of the incentive package.
4. International coordination.
5. Intellectual property rights.
There are obvious ﬁnancial constraints on the size of the incentive,
as well as differing philosophies on the role of direct government
involvement. A related challenge concerns managing the selected
incentive package. A new regulatory agency or governing body may be
required to determine public health priorities, deﬁne the optimal
number and depth of drug speciﬁcations linked to incentives, calculate
socially fair rewards and monitor development progress. This is
especially important as many of the recent proposals operate on a
global scale and require coordination, input and agreement across
borders (for example, AHIF, AIFM and WHO Global Consortium).
This new organization could operate under a new agency or as part of
an existing forum such as the G-20.
It is increasingly recognized that delinking sales volume from
ﬁnancial motivation to develop antibiotics is valuable to controlling
AMR and facilitating equitable access to novel antibiotics.10 Several
delinkage models such as patent buyouts, AHIF and AIFM are based
on the concept of transferring intellectual property (IP) to the public
domain that poses a major hurdle to implementation. From a public
health perspective it makes sense to shift control of new antibiotic IP
from the private to the public domain, but this change poses a risk to
the industry. Many pharmaceutical companies want to keep patent
rights because it provides additional assurance that costs can be
recouped if incentives and policies are reneged or are inadequate. If
transferring IP to the public domain is not feasible, these types of
delinkage models become irrelevant. However, if this were the case,
delinkage can still be created through incentives such as payer licenses,
guaranteed revenue minimums or advanced market commitments
(AMCs). Table 4 summarizes our assessment of each incentive strategy
based on the market criteria, the public health objectives and
implementation feasibility.
Example applications of the framework
Given the market failures endemic to antibiotic R&D, an incentive
package should ﬁrst correct market deﬁciencies. The framework
outlined above is useful for this purpose. The package can then be
augmented to address public health issues regarding antibiotic
conservation and patient access. The following are three examples of
the application of the above framework in devising an appropriate
incentive strategy.
Scenario 1: A single type 1 incentive. The WHO’s Global Consortium
for stimulating antibiotic R&D is a well-rounded, hybrid model with
ﬁve parts: (1) support at the drug discovery stage through milestone
prizes and an open source platform, (2) grants for academics, SMEs
and big pharmaceutical ﬁrms to lower development barriers and risk,
(3) patent buyout prizes for proven novel antibiotics, (4) public
funding of clinical trials and (5) advance purchase commitments to
preserve antibiotics.35,36 The WHO model attempts to create a
product-development partnership (PDP) across the entire pharma-
ceutical value chain, or what is referred to as a global consortium. The
WHO Global Consortium explicitly addresses each of the six
objectives. Early milestone payments enhance project NPV by redu-
cing early costs that can have an even greater impact overall because of
the time value of money. SME participation is explicitly encouraged
with early-stage grants and an open source platform. Public funding of
clinical trials appeals to large and small ﬁrms alike by reducing overall
project costs and risk.37 Patent buyouts facilitate antibiotic stewardship
by negating the need for excessive marketing or production. However,
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Table 4 Criteria-based assessment of incentive strategies
Strategy Improves NPV?
Enables 
participation of 
SMEs?
Encourages 
participation of 
large cap firms?
Facilitates 
cooperation & 
synergy?
Promotes 
antibiotic 
stewardship?
Improves patient 
access?
Minimizes 
barriers to 
implementation?
Supporting open 
access to research
Grants for scientific 
personnel
Direct funding
Conditional Grants
Funding translational 
research
Tax incentives
Refundable tax 
credits
PDPs
Pull strategies
Outcome-based pull  strategies
Lego-regulatory pull strategies
Lump sum monetary
prize
Milestone prize
P4P
Patent buyout
Payer license
Push strategies
Research 
tournament
Optional reward
AMC
AHIF
AIFM
Strategic Antibiotic 
Reserve
Service -availability 
premium
Accelerated 
assessment and 
approval
Market exclusivity 
extensions
TIPR
Conservation-based 
market exclusivity
Liability protection
Anti - trust waivers
Sui generis rights
Value-based 
reimbursement
GAIN Act
LPAD Approval
Priority review 
vouchers
NTAP
DISARM Act
21st Century Cures 
Act
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to be attractive, these end prizes would need to be sufﬁciently large,
and calculating this in such a way to minimize waste while providing
sufﬁcient incentive may prove difﬁcult. Patient access could be assured
by partnering with worldwide generic producers who could keep costs
low for patients.10 Still, the consortium itself, along with its ﬁnancing
for public trials and end prizes, would have to be publicly ﬁnanced,
shifting costs and risk to the public sector. Given the massive scope of
this model, there are numerous implementation issues that pose
serious challenges to overcome. These include attaining adequate
public funding for grants, patent buyouts and clinical trials, coordi-
nating a new global entity to manage the consortium and liaising with
industry to reach an agreement on IP rights.10
Scenario 2: A combination of a type 2 and type 3 incentives. The
Options Market for Antibiotics (OMA) model is a hybrid mechanism
that allows government or nongovernmental organization purchasers
to invest in a drug in early-stage development. In this model, funders
may purchase the right to buy a speciﬁed number of antibiotics at a
reduced price, if and when the antibiotic ever made it to market.15 In
many ways, this could be considered a form of milestone payments,
but with a future discount for options holders. The early payments, if
large enough, could both improve the overall NPV and enable greater
participation of SMEs. Larger pharmaceutical ﬁrms may be attracted
by the risk-sharing element of the venture, in that funders may pay
when antibiotics are in early clinical development. This also indirectly
signals a potential commitment to purchase the product upon
marketing approval. Lower prices or even marginal cost pricing at
marketing approval will help to facilitate patient access. In addition,
antibiotic stewardship can be promoted by combining the OMA with
an AMC. Bulk purchasing commitments would shift control of sales
volume to the sponsor and allow for appropriate distribution of the
antibiotic. However, such a scheme would do little to directly facilitate
cooperation among corporations, unless it was combined with
modiﬁcations to anti-trust laws. If enacted in isolation, anti-trust
waivers could hinder patient access to medicine by allowing collusion
among producers to maintain artiﬁcially high prices. The goal of such
reforms would be to promote cooperation and synergy across the
antibiotic market.12 Although cooperation would be desirable in the
early development phases, it would not be desirable in the marketing
phase with regards to setting prices. Such reforms could be applied to
the OMA model by allowing companies to share early-stage data,
potentially increasing the transitional probabilities from one phase to
the next in later development.
Scenario 3: A combination of type 3, type 4 and type 5 incentives. The
Antibiotic Conservation Effectiveness (ACE) Program is a hybrid
strategy that combines outcomes-based and lego-regulatory pull
mechanisms with the objective of promoting antibiotic conservation.
The Program has four key components: (1) P4P payments centered on
public health and conservation goals, (2) conservation-based market
exclusivity, (3) value-based reimbursement that ties drug pricing to the
effectiveness of the drug and (4) anti-trust waivers that allow
coordination of conservation activities between developers.14 Given
the pull-centric nature of the ACE Program, this incentive package
particularly targets large cap pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, it
would be beneﬁcial to augment this package with a SME-focused
incentive such as direct funding. Antibiotic research addressing speciﬁc
health priorities can be targeted through direct funding and can
include expert technical and managerial help that may prove useful to
SMEs with less experience. The ACE Program does not facilitate
patient access nor promote cooperation and synergy between industry
and the government. Thus, there is role for a LPAD approval system in
Table 4 Continued
Hybrid strategies
Special drug 
designation status
OMA
Office of Health 
Economics’ model
ACE Program
Project BioShield
RADARS Program
Antibiotics as public 
goods
LPAD Plus
WHO Global 
Consortium
GlaxoSmithKline
Delinkage Model
Mechanisms to fund incentives
Strategy Improves NPV?
Enables 
participation of 
SMEs?
Encourages 
participation of 
large cap firms ?
Facilitates 
cooperation & 
synergy?
Promotes 
antibiotic 
stewardship?
Improves patient 
access?
Minimizes 
barriers to 
implementation?
Fast-track option for 
funding
Antibiotic Corporate 
Bond
AIC Fee
Abbreviations: ACE, Antibiotic Conservation Effectiveness; AHIF, Antibiotic Health Impact Fund; AIC, Antibiotic Innovation and Conservation; AIFM, Antibiotic Innovation Funding Mechanism; AMC,
Advanced Market Commitment; DISARM, Developing an Innovative Strategy for Antimicrobial Resistant Microbes; GAIN Act, Generating Antibiotic Innovation Now Act; LPAD, Limited Population
Antibacterial Drug; NPV, net present value; NTAP, new technology add-on payment; OMA, options market for antibiotics; P4P, pay-for-performance; PDP, product-development partnership; RADARS,
Rewarding Antibiotic Development and Responsible Stewardship; SME, small- and medium-sized enterprises; TIPR, transferable intellectual property rights; WHO, World Health Organization.
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this incentive package. Under the LPAD approval system, the safety
and efﬁcacy of an antibiotic targeting a newly resistant pathogen would
be examined through smaller, faster and less costly clinical trials.
LPAD-designated antibiotics would be limited to a narrow indication
for which there is a particularly high patient need and therapeutic
beneﬁt. With this system the regulatory agency would provide
signiﬁcant guidance to the developer and continue monitoring the
effectiveness of the drug beyond approval.38
In transitioning from single incentives to more complex, interna-
tional business models, implementation becomes signiﬁcantly more
difﬁcult. A feasible, yet comprehensive, incentive strategy likely will
include a wide selection of smaller incentives that collectively address
market and public health aspects as opposed to a revolutionary
antibiotic business model. In our opinion, the ideal package would
include several incentives that facilitate cooperation and synergy
throughout the market, one or two R&D-linked push incentives and
a large pull incentive rewarding successful development.
CONCLUSION
Antimicrobial resistance is a complex health policy problem. Multiple
market failures make it ﬁnancially unattractive for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies to invest in antibiotic discovery and devel-
opment. This problem is complicated by incentives to oversell
antibiotics and distribute based on ability to pay instead of need.
This systematic literature review has identiﬁed 47 incentives that could
be used to encourage and accelerate R&D of novel antibiotics. These
incentives have been classiﬁed using the push–pull framework and
their individual advantages and disadvantages have been evaluated.
However, given the large number of possible incentive schemes, a
decision framework is needed to help select an effective package of
incentives. An ideal solution will tackle the market deﬁciencies that
have resulted in the stagnant market, address the public health
priorities that reﬂect the growing need for a sustainable solution to
AMR and operate within implementation constraints. Because of the
complexity of the problem, we suggest ﬁrst developing an incentive
package that addresses the core market failures. This can be further
enhanced to achieve public health objectives such as antibiotic
conservation and patient access. The above framework acknowledges
that there are multiple viable solutions to stimulating antibiotic
discovery and development that will ultimately be determined by
government priorities, industry demands and operational realities
unique to a particular country.
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